

# Secure Administration: Securing the Keys to the Kingdom

This paper outlines the best practices for #2 Secure Administration.

Planning and Preparation Activities	Recovery and Reconstitution Activities
0. <i>Disrupting the Attack Surface</i>	
1. <i>Architect to Protect</i>	7. <i>Cyber COOP Execution</i>
2. <b>Secure Administration</b>	8. <i>Secure Communications</i>
3. <i>Access Control</i>	9. <i>Core Services</i>
4. <i>Device Hardening</i>	10. <i>Data Recovery Strategies</i>
5. <i>Backup Strategies</i>	11. <i>Forensics</i>
6. <i>Cyber Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning</i>	12. <i>After Action Activities</i>

## The BIG Idea

By using secure system administration and management capabilities, an organization can substantially reduce the opportunities for advanced adversaries to gain elevated privileges and wide-spread network access.

## Cyber Resiliency Goals & Objectives

The Secure Administration supports the cyber resiliency *Anticipate*<sup>1</sup> and *Withstand* goals and the *Prevent* and *Prepare* objectives.

## Design Principles

The design principles for secure administration create a more resilient enterprise infrastructure by making it more difficult for adversaries and non-administrative users to gain access via unauthorized, privileged actions.

- *Coordinated Defense*: Develop Administrator Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in coordination with business operations and Cyber Courses of Action across multiple administrative domains.
- *Privilege Restriction*: Apply good practice standards for least privilege, separation of duties, and role-based access control across administrator accounts; limit administrator account access to non-essential capabilities (e.g., e-mail, Internet).
- *Segmentation*: Designate systems exclusively for administration tasks; physically and logically separate administration and management control channels from the primary enterprise network. As appropriate, further separate activities and functions of privileged users into privileged and non-privileged functions.

## What Can Be Done Now

The following resiliency techniques can help transform business processes and redesign systems to use existing technologies more effectively:

- *Coordinated Defense*
  - Ensure that critical resource protections are consistent across the enterprise and are consistent with risk management considerations (i.e., the consequences of a critical resource being compromised)

<sup>1</sup> All italicized words are defined in the [Cyber Resiliency Terms and Concepts](#) document.

- Review current administrator SOPs and coordinate security procedures to achieve mission goals.
- *Privilege Restriction*
  - Examine roles, duties and functions to determine the least privilege and function required to perform the mission (for both individuals and systems).
  - Implement changes to enforce principles of least privilege and separation of duties as well as limiting the time for which credentials are valid.
  - Require multi-factor authentication for administrative accounts or any specialized system (e.g., jump station, bastion host) intended to perform some critical security function.
  - Prevent caching administrator credentials.
- *Segmentation*
  - Dedicate specific systems for use only for certain administration tasks.
  - Create an out-of-band management network to administer critical systems.
  - Disallow administration from outside the organization's internal network.
  - Remove all externally facing administration capabilities.

## The Right People & Policies

Creating a foundation of resiliency requires specific skills and policies, including:

- Enterprise architects and defenders who understand the risks posed by administrative accounts and privileges.
- System administrators who will do the right thing—even when it is not convenient—to enhance security.
- Strategic planning to ensure that future capabilities are securely administered and monitored.

## Cyber Attack Lifecycle<sup>2</sup>

Using the cyber resiliency techniques, *coordinated defense*, *privilege restriction*, and *segmentation*, as described above, defenders can impede the adversary's attack on the enterprise and limit the damage the malware causes. The use of *coordinated defense*, *privilege restriction*, and *segmentation* impede the adversary's ability to initiate the exploit. When the adversary attempts to manage the initial victims both *privilege restriction* and *segmentation* limits and impedes these efforts. *Coordinated defense* in concert with *privilege restriction* and *segmentation* limit and impede the adversary's ability to execute the attack plan and maintain a presence in the enterprise.

## Synergies and Barriers

Synergies among practices include Privilege Restriction and Segmentation. Applying these practices will reduce opportunities for adversaries to gain elevated privileges and wide-spread network access.

- *Privilege Restriction*, by requiring multi-factor authentication for administrator accounts and applying the principles of least privilege.
- *Segmentation*, by physically isolating access to critical systems.
- Virtualization can also augment *segmentation* and *non-persistence*

Barriers to adoption include:

- System administration shortcuts implemented without considering security implications, increase the exposure of administrative channels or privileges.
- Capabilities that do not support secure administration (e.g., no dedicated administration port).

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<sup>2</sup> The Cyber Attack Lifecycle is described in the [Cyber Attack Lifecycle and Resilience](#) document.

- Policies and cultures that favor cost and efficiency over security and resilience.

## Just Ahead

Secure administration practices must adjust to emerging technologies. Virtualization, for example, requires both host and guest platforms to be securely administered. Virtual and software-defined networks modify network routing, making management more challenging, while biometrics and new authentication approaches may offer better protection of administrator accounts.