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Cyber COOP Planning

Operationalizing Resiliency



Overview

Increasing resilience against threats of destructive malware requires insight into the current security posture, planning and coordinating key defensive actions, and aligning key defensive resources correctly. This document describes how to apply Dynamic Representation, Coordinated Defense, and Realignment resiliency techniques into cyber architectures, techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs).

Applying Dynamic Representation to Detect and Analyze Adversary Activity

Dynamic Representation is the capability to reflect changes in state or behavior and materializes through constructing and maintaining a dynamic representation of components, systems, services, mission dependencies, adversary activities, and effects or alternative cyber courses of action. Dynamic Representation should first ensure the existence of static representations and then expand upon them so adversary actions, once detected and analyzed, will inform mission situational awareness and response. Dynamic Representation implementation approaches include:

Priorities for Immediate Action with Dynamic Representation

Applying Coordinated Defense to Delay and Degrade Adversary Activity

Coordinated Defense is using a coordinated, adaptively managed approach for applying multiple, distinct defense mechanisms at different architectural levels and with different configurations settings to delay, degrade, and deny adversary actions upon critical core resources. Coordinated Defense implementation may entail:

Technical Defense-in-Depth: Using multiple protective mechanisms applied at different architectural layers or locations. Coordination and Consistency Analysis: Applying processes, supported by analytic tools, to ensure that defenses are applied and cyber courses-of-action are defined and executed in a coordinated, consistent, and non-disruptive way. Adaptive Management: Changing how defense mechanisms are used based on changes in the operational environment as well as changes in the threat environment. Course of Action (CoA) Analysis: Maintaining a set of alternative CoAs, with supporting analysis of resource requirements, contingencies for meeting those requirements, and effects of CoAs on current and future mission capabilities.

Priorities for Immediate Action with Coordinated Defense

Develop a cyber 'Go Bag' with essential procedures and information. Assemble mobile cyber security toolkits that include procedures for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and enabling the continuance of cyber resilient TTPs within a COOP-designated facility (refer to www.sans.org for an example). Develop, test and validate playbooks, roles, responsibilities, and tools. Designate specific cyber roles, associated responsibilities, and the cyber tools that may be deployed to ensure implementation of cyber COOP. Define standard cyber COOP plays for individual or cyber team execution using cyber 'Go Bag' tools and elastic TTPs. Conduct different types of cyber exercises (e.g. mini-table top type exercises) using the cyber 'Go Bag' and playbook. Define collaboration processes and acquire tools for cyber defenders and incident responders. Ensure both mobile and stationary cyber COOP processes incorporate communication and coordination dovetailing to promote adequate management of cyber defenses, synergy among all response activities, and reduction of security coverage gaps during recovery activities.

Applying Realignment to Degrade and Delay Adversary Activity

Realignment is defining and determining the operational implications and resource needs of alternate and primary mission and cyber defender courses of action. Realignment aligns cyber resources with core aspects of mission/business functions and helps reduce the attack surface, thereby degrading and delaying adversary activity. Realignment implementation entails:

Purposing: The mission purposes of functions, services (including connectivity as well as processing), information and systems are identified, to prevent uses that increase risk without any corresponding mission benefit. Offloading/Outsourcing: Supportive but non-essential functions are offloaded to a service provider that is better able to support the service. Agility/Repurposing: System elements are repurposed to provide services, information, and connectivity to meet new or changing mission needs. Customization: Critical components are custom-developed or re-implemented. Restriction: Risky functionality or connectivity is removed or replaced with less risky implementations.

Priorities for Immediate Action with Realignment

Identify mission and business function dependencies on cyber resources. Determine the mission purposes of resources so that uses that increase risk without any corresponding mission benefit can be identified and eliminated. Identify and remove or replace data feeds and connections for which risks outweigh benefits. Consider the interdependencies between and among mission and non-mission business functions organizations that share critical roles in the delivery of NEF capabilities. Reallocate resources or reassign administrative and management responsibility based on risk to mission and business function. Identify non-mission and business function dependencies on or uses of cyber resources. Make use of mission flow analysis, mission dependency analysis, tabletop exercises, and Red Teaming to uncover undocumented mission dependencies. Review and correlate mission and business functions with dependency model mapping and impact analysis activities and results. Identify systems, applications and processes of non-mission critical functions and the resources that support them. Assess those functions against a fluid Cyber COOP implementation strategy to accommodate priority operations and better dependency utilization or elimination.

Preparing for the Future

With the advent of the internet of things, dependency analysis (which underlies Dynamic Representation) will become much harder to discern. This is because components that traditionally did not have cyber elements (e.g., appliances) will now (or in the near future) have such cyber elements opening these components up to potential cyber-attack and increases the mission cyber-attack surface. This in turn increases the complexity of determining dependencies between components because two components that only have direct physical dependencies (e.g., car and fuel pump) may now have indirect cyber dependencies (e.g., cyber compromise of fuel pump could disable it, thus impacting the fueling of the car). This increase in complexity due to incorporating devices with embedded systems into larger ecosystems has the potential for unintended consequences. For example, the incorporation of wireless capabilities into avionics may cause the avionics to be impacted if not properly isolated from passenger use of Wi-Fi

See Key Concepts and Terms for definitions

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